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Abstract
Market makers play an important role in providing liquidity to markets by con-
tinuously quoting prices at which they are willing to buy and sell, and managing
inventory risk. In this paper, we build a multi-agent simulation of a dealer market
and demonstrate that it can be used to understand the behavior of a reinforcement
learning (RL) based market maker agent. We use the simulator to train an RL-based
market maker agent with different competitive scenarios, reward formulations and
market price trends (drifts). We show that the reinforcement learning agent is able
to learn about its competitor’s pricing policy; it also learns to manage inventory by
smartly selecting asymmetric prices on the buy and sell sides (skewing), and main-
taining a positive (or negative) inventory depending on whether the market price
drift is positive (or negative). Finally, we propose and test reward formulations for
creating risk averse RL-based market maker agents.
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms have had considerable success in surpassing human
level performance in several single and multi-agent learning problems. A key ingredient of these
advances has been the availability of gaming and physics simulators which provide a ready stream of
experience for developing, training and testing algorithms. However, the financial domain lacks a
similar suite of simulators that could be used to conduct research.
Simulators provide more than just data for sample-intensive RL algorithms; they also provide a
platform to conduct controlled experiments to test what is being "learnt" by an agent, how a policy
performs in different scenarios and the causality between changes in the environment and agent
behavior. Simulators can also be used to train an agent in a diverse set of scenarios, leading to
improved generalization and robustness to changes in the environment. In this paper we build a
multi-agent simulator for a dealer market and demonstrate that it can be used to train an RL-based
market maker agent and understand its behavior.
Market makers play an important role in providing liquidity to markets by continuously quoting
prices at which they are willing to buy and sell. In this paper, we focus on a dealer market (also
commonly known as an over-the-counter or OTC market) where there is a single security being traded
and market makers continuously stream prices to buyers and sellers (referred to as investors). The
investors, who come to the market to execute their orders, observe these prices and select the market
maker they want to trade with. The two types of agents - market makers and investors - interact
directly with each other, and only observe the transactions that they are involved in and reference
price information from an exchange.
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A marker maker’s policies around pricing and risk management in this market depend on its objectives
and preferences (e.g. how risk averse it is), the policies of competing market makers, the overall
market environment (e.g. volatility) and trade flow from investors. Our objective in this paper is to
use the multi-agent simulator to study the performance of a reinforcement learning (RL) based market
making agent under different competitive scenarios, reward formulations and market environments.
In order to model different competitive scenarios, we formalize the dealer market as a multi-agent
system and build a simulator with the ability to instantiate market maker agents with different policies.
In particular, we implement an adaptive market maker agent which acts as a realistic benchmark and
competitor for the RL agent. We then train an RL-based market maker against different competitors,
with varying reward formulations and market environment conditions, and study its behavior and
performance.
1.1 Related Work
The market making problem has been extensively studied in finance and economics literature, largely
as an optimal control problem. Classical models such as Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson
(1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), and more recently Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) and Guéant, Lehalle,
and Fernandez-Tapia (2013), focus on the role of inventory risk in determining the optimal pricing
strategy for a market maker. Other models, such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), study the role of
adverse selection risk arising from informed traders in the market. All these works model a single
market maker and make assumptions about the distributions of order arrivals and price to derive
analytical solutions for the market maker’s pricing policy using stochastic optimal control techniques.
In contrast, in our approach the distribution of order arrivals for a market maker naturally arises from
the strategies and attributes of other agents in the system.
Market making has also been studied in the agent-based modeling (ABM) literature (e.g. Darley et
al. (2000), Das (2005),Das (2008), Jumadinova and Dasgupta (2010), Wah, Wright, and Wellman
(2017)), but the agents tend to be simplistic with a view to studying market equilibria and endogeneous
price formation rather than developing realistic market making strategies.
Most previous work focuses on market making in limit order book markets where all agents submit
their orders to a central matching facility and can observe all outstanding orders and executed
transactions in the market. In contrast, there has been relatively little work focused on dealer markets
(Guéant (2017), Bank, Ekren, and Muhle-Karbe (2018), Ghoshal and Roberts (2016))where the agents
interact directly with each other and only observe the trades they are involved in. Our multi-agent
simulation realistically replicates the partial observability conditions of a dealer market allowing us
to study the challenges it poses for reinforcement learning algorithms.
Chan and Shelton (2001), and more recently, Lim and Gorse (2018) and Spooner et al. (2018) have
developed RL-based market making approaches for limit order book markets; however, they do not
explicitly model the competing market makers or study different competitive scenarios.
1.2 Our Contributions
We make the following contributions in this paper: (i) we formalize the dealer market as a multi-agent
system (section 3); (ii) we define an adaptive market making policy inspired by the mean-variance
optimization techniques commonly used in finance (section 4).; (iii) we conduct extensive experiments
with competing market maker agents and are able to draw some key insights about what the RL-based
market maker is learning. (sections 5, 6). In particular, we show that the RL-based market maker is
able to learn about its competitor’s pricing strategy and manage inventory by skewing prices; it also
learns to exploit any significant market price drift by building inventory; (iv) we propose and test
several reward formulations that can be used to create a risk-averse RL-based market maker (section
6.3).
We start by defining the mechanics of the dealer market and key terminology in the next section.
2 Dealer Market - Definitions
Prices and Spreads: In a dealer market with a single traded security, each market maker has to
stream two prices at each time step - the price at which it is willing to buy (bid) and the price at
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which it is willing to sell (ask). We assume that there is also an exchange limit order book market
(LOB) for the same security, and that all market makers receive reference pricing information from
this exchange.
The exchange reference price can be broken down into two components: (a) the mid-price P , which
is defined as the average of the best bid and ask in the LOB, and (b) the spread Sbref or S
s
ref , which is
defined as the difference between the price of a buy/sell trade on the exchange and the mid-price. By
convention, market makers also quote their buy/sell prices relative to the exchange mid-price i.e. the
i-th market maker quotes spreads Sbi (buy) and S
s
i (sell). Note that this implies that the market maker
buys at Pt − Sbi and sells at Pt + Ssi .
Spread PnL: For each trade with an investor, the market maker earns a profit that is referred to as
spread PnL. In practice, the spreads are a function of the trade size. Thus, for a trade of size v, the
market maker earns a profit of v · Sbi (v) if it is a buy, and v · Ssi (v) if it is a sell.
Inventory: As the market maker executes trades with investors, it will typically accumulate an
inventory zt, which could be positive or negative depending on whether the agent has bought more
than it sold up to time t, or vice versa. By convention, buys are positive and sells are negative in the
inventory calculation. 1
Inventory PnL: A non-zero inventory exposes the market maker to risk from mid-price fluctuations.
If the market maker holds an inventory of zt from t to t+ 1, and the mid-price changes from Pt to
Pt+1, the value of the inventory changes by (Pt+1 − Pt) · zt.
Hedging: Ideally, a market maker would like to keep a small inventory so as to minimize risk. The
market maker could choose to reduce risk by initiating a trade which reduces its inventory (e.g. try to
buy if it has negative inventory) - this is referred to as hedging. In doing so, it incurs a cost since it
assumes the role of a price-taker in the hedging transaction.
Internalization and Skewing: The market maker could also try to reduce risk organically by skewing
its prices to attract trades that offset its inventory. For example, if it has a positive inventory, it could
make its buy prices less attractive and sell prices more attractive to investors. The effect of organic
risk mitigation by offsetting investor trades is referred to as internalizaton.
Market share: As multiple market makers compete in a dealer market, each one captures a portion
of the investor trade flow depending on its pricing. The percentage of total trades captured by a
market maker, weighted by trade size, is referred to as its market share.
3 Multi-Agent Simulator
We consider a dealer market with M market makers and N investors and a single traded security. A
trade between market maker i and investor j at time t is denoted by vi,j,t; buys are positive, sells are
negative and zero implies no trade.
3.1 Market Maker Agent
The observations, actions and rewards for the i-th market maker at time t are summarized below.
The market maker receives observations about investor trades it won in the previous time step and
reference prices for current time step. It then decides on the prices to stream for time step t and any
hedge trades to execute. Finally, it receives a set of rewards in the form of spread PnL, hedge cost
and inventory PnL.
Observations. (i) Trades executed in previous time step: {vi,j,t−1}j=1:N ; (ii) Inventory zi,t =
zi,t−1 +
∑
j=1:N vi,j,t−1; (iii) Reference mid-price Pt and spread curves S
b
ref,t(v) and S
s
ref,t(v);
(iv) Market share, or equivalently, total market volume in previous time step.
Actions. (i) Pricing: Determine spreads Sbi,t(v) and Ssi,t(v) to stream; (ii) Hedging: Determine
fraction xi,t of the inventory zi,t to hedge.
Rewards. (i) Spread PnL: For each investor trade v, the market maker earns |v|·Sbi,t(v) or |v|·Ssi,t(v),
depending on whether it is a buy/sell; (ii) Hedge Cost: Market maker pays a cost of |v| · Sbref,t(v) if
1Buys and sells are from the market maker’s perspective unless otherwise noted.
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it is selling and |v| · Ssref,t(v) if it is buying, where v = −xi,tzi,t; assuming that the market maker
hedges with the exchange; (iii) Inventory PnL: (Pt+1−Pt) ·zt; (iv) Total PnL =Sspread PnL + Hedge
Cost + Inventory PnL.
In this paper, we assume that the buy spread streamed by a market maker agent is of the form
Sbt (v) := S
b
ref,t(v) · (1 + b), where the market maker subscript is dropped for simplicity (a similar
relation is assumed for the sell spread). Thus, the pricing action reduces to a choice of b and s at
each time step t.
Based on this parametrization, we can define two simple baseline market maker agents: (a) Random
Agent that picks b, s ∼ Unif[min, max], and the fraction to hedge x ∼ Unif[0, 1] at each time
step (b) Persistent Agent that keeps a fixed b, s and hedges a fixed fraction x at each time step.
3.2 Investor Agent
We assume that each investor agent has a trade generation process specified by probability distributions
for trade size, direction and arrival. The investor agent executes the trade in the same time step by
picking the market maker to trade with that offers him the best price.
3.3 Exchange reference price
The mid price process P is diffused as a geometric brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ,
i.e. Pt = Pt−1 exp(µ∆− 0.5σ2∆ + σ
√
∆Zt), where (Zt) are i.i.d. standard normal and ∆ is the
timestep value (∆ =15 mins). Note that E[Pt] = P0 exp(µ∆).
The reference spread curves Ssref,t(v), S
b
ref,t(v) are assumed to be equal and are sampled at each
timestep from a statistical model calibrated to real market data (details in Appendix).
4 Adaptive Market Maker Agent
In this section, we will define a more realistic, adaptive pricing and hedging policy for the market
maker agent. The pricing/hedging algorithms used in this section are inspired by standard mean-
variance trade-off formulations used in the mathematical finance literature for pricing and hedging,
cf Almgren and Chriss (2001), Bank, Ekren, and Muhle-Karbe (2018), further tailored to suit our
framework.
We assume that the adaptive market maker maintains an empirical response table with estimates of
the mean and variances of the incoming net flow v and the normalized spread PnL s (normalized
by Sref(0)) as a function of (b, s). In our experiments, the agent uses its observations at each time
step to update the table with an exponential forgetting factor of β (set to 0.35 ). We also assume
that the agent holds an estimate of the mid-price volatility σ, below we will use the normal volatility
σˆ := σ
√
∆Pt over the each interval [t, t+ 1].
Overall, the adaptive market maker’s policy is determined by two static parameters - market share
target ηms and risk aversion γ, and the empirical response table which is dynamically updated based
on the agent’s observations. Results showing that the adaptive agent outperforms simple baseline
agents are included in the Appendix.
4.1 Adaptive Pricing Policy
The adaptive market maker chooses (b, s) at each time step to (a) meet its market share target ηms,
and (b) internalize by skewing its prices. It does this in two steps:
Step 1: The market maker picks b = s = ∗ to achieve its market share target ηms within a
tolerance δtol = 5% by solving
∗ = max { : |cost1()−minxcost1(x)| ≤ δtol} ; cost1() :=
∣∣∣∣ηms − E[v]Vmarket
∣∣∣∣
where Vmarket is the observed total market volume and E[v] is looked up from the empirical
estimates. This step ensures that the market maker is able to adapt its pricing if it is getting little or
no trade flow.
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Step 2: The market maker then skews only one side (buy/sell) to attract a flow that offsets its current
inventory z i.e. if it has negative (positive) inventory it decreases b (s) to attract offsetting buys
(sells). However, decreasing spreads impacts spread PnL; so the market maker has to trade-off
between the loss of spread PnL and the risk of carrying inventory in deciding how much to skew.
It selects the optimal  for the side it is skewing (while the other side is kept fixed to ∗) so as to
minimize the below cost function:
cost2() := −Sref(0)E[s]︸ ︷︷ ︸
spread PnL
+γ
√√√√ Sref(0)2var[s]︸ ︷︷ ︸
spread PnL uncertainty
+ σˆ2E[(z + v)
2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of risk + internalization
In the above, the mid-price increment over one timestep is assumed to be normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance σˆ2; E[s], var[s], E[v], var[v] are empirical estimates; and γ is the
risk-aversion parameter representing the mean-variance trade-off.
4.2 Adaptive Hedging Policy
The approach we choose for hedging is similar to the mean-variance approach in step 2 of 4.1. In
hedging, the market maker has to decide the fraction x of the current inventory z to hedge by initiating
an offsetting trade. In doing so, the market maker has to trade off between (a) the cost of hedging
(which increases with the size of the hedge trade), and (b) the risk of carrying inventory and being
impacted by mid-price changes.
The market makers’s cost over one timestep is c(x) := |xz|Sref(xz)− σˆ(z(1− x) + v)Z, where
Z ∼ N(0, 1). This leads to setting x so as to minimize the below cost function:
costhedge(x) := |xz|Sref(xz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hedge cost
+γ
√
σˆ2E[(z(1− x) + v)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of risk + internalization
In the above, E[v] and var[v] are empirical estimates, and the risk aversion parameter γ is chosen
to be the same as the one using in pricing, for consistency.
5 RL-based Market Maker Agent
We use a standard implementation of the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm with clipped
objective in Rllib (Schulman et al. (2017), Liang et al. (2017)) to train the RL-based market maker.
The input to the policy network includes all the observations available to the agent at that time step
(see 3.1), as well as the inventory PnL from the previous time step. The outputs of the policy network
are the pricing parameters b, s ∈ [−1, 1] and the fraction to hedge x ∈ [0, 1]. By default, the RL
agent uses the Total Pnl specified in 3.1 as the scalar reward to train its policy.
5.1 Optimal pricing for spread PnL
Our primary objective is to understand the behavior of an RL-based market maker when it is trained
against different competitors. In order to assess whether the RL agent is learning about its competitor’s
policy, we derive the optimal b, s in Theorem 1 for a simplified case where the RL agent competes
with exactly one other market maker. (proof in Appendix).
Theorem 1 The expected spread PnL of an agent competing with a market maker agent that quotes
buy/sell prices according to the distributions F compj (x) := P [
comp
j ≤ x], j ∈ {b, s}, is maximized
by setting:
j = argmax(1 + )(1− F compj () + pFˆ compj ())
where p is the probability that the agent wins the trade when both agents quote the same price,
Fˆ compj () := P [
comp
j = ] = F
comp
j ()− F compj (−). The result holds under the assumption that
investor trades are possibly random but independent from compb , 
comp
s . In particular, if F
comp
b ,
F comps are Unif[a, b], with −1 ≤ a ≤ b, then we get ∗b = ∗s = 12 max(2a, b− 1).
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5.2 Reward formulations for risk aversion
Our basic reward definition of Total PnL models an agent that is not risk averse. However, in practice,
a market maker would not prefer its inventory PnL to be volatile, e.g. high losses combined with high
gains. To model this risk aversion, we add a penalty term to the Total PnL which aims at reducing
the inventory PnL variance. This aversion to mid-price fluctuations is modeled in the adaptive
market maker via its risk aversion coefficient. We propose the following risk penalty functions and
empirically compare them in our experiments.
• [InvPnL Stdev] Penalty = −α · Std10(InventoryPnL) (rolling 10-timestep Stdev).
• [InvPnL2] Penalty = −α · InventoryPnL2
• [Asymmetric] Penalty = α ·min(0, InventoryPnL)
In our experiments α = 0.4, 0.07 and 0.3, respectively, for the three penalty functions. These values
were chosen by trial-and-error to be ranges where the RL agent still chooses to trade; a very large
penalty term results in the RL agent choosing not to trade at all by setting a high spread.
5.3 Experimental settings
In our experiments, we use a 2-layer fully-connected neural network with 256 nodes in each layer
and tanh activation functions for the PPO policy network and a PPO clip parameter of 0.3. For each
training iteration, we take one step of minibatch SGD via Adam with a minibatch size of 256 and
learning rate of 5e-5.
For each of experiments, we trained an RL policy starting from 5 different initial random seeds. In
experiments with the RL agent, the agent is first trained against the competitor until convergence; the
final policy is then used to calculate performance measures.
6 Experiments
All experiments are conducted with a set of 20 investor agents, each of which generate a buy or sell
order of unit size at each time step with equal probability. The exchange mid-price has zero drift
(µ = 0) and volatility (σ = 0.1), unless otherwise specified.
In all our experiments, we use the Total Pnl defined in 3.1 as the key performance measure to compare
market maker agents. For a given set of agent policies, we evaluate metrics per time-step, averaged
across 5000 or more simulation timesteps and 5 random seeds. All PnL metrics are multiplied by 100
for readability.
6.1 Competitive Scenarios
We trained an RL-based market maker against competing random, persistent and adaptive market
makers. In all experiments, the PPO policy was able to converge (convergence plots in Appendix).
Performance: The RL agent was able to outperform the random and persistent agents in all experi-
ments (Table 1). It also clearly outperforms the adaptive agent when the adaptive agent is risk averse
(γ = 2); but the adaptive agent is able to close the gap/outperform at lower risk aversion (Table 2).
Figure 2 shows the convergence of the total reward for the RL and adaptive agents during training.
Unlike the random or persistent agents which have fixed policies, the adaptive agent actively responds
to changes in RL agent’s policy by adapting its empirical response table. Note that the RL agent in
this case is not risk averse and pursues Total PnL. If the adaptive agent is not risk averse (γ = 0) and
targets a 0.5 market share, it is able to converge to a similar reward as the RL agent; but it loses if it
is risk averse (γ = 2).
Learning the competitor pricing strategy: Using Theorem 1, we can compute the optimal strategy
for spread PnL maximization. In our experiments (see Table 3), we find that the RL agent prices, on
average, just below the persistent agent as expected. Against the random agents, it prices, on average,
close to the "optimal point" of 0 against Unif[−1, 1] and -0.25 against Unif[−0.5, 0.5].
Furthermore, if we look at the distribution of b for the RL agent (Figure 1), we find that the peak of
the distribution corresponds to the "optimal pricing point", i.e.  = 0 against the random agent and
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Table 1: RL Agent vs Random/Persistent: Av-
erage excess PnL per time-step of RL agent
over competitor
Competitor Spread PnL Inventory PnL Hedge Cost Total PnL
Persistent (-0.5) 21.60 0.40 8.10 29.30
Persistent (0.0) 74.20 0.20 1.80 76.20
Random (Unif[−0.5, 0.5]) 33.90 0.40 25.50 59.70
Random (Unif[−1.0, 1.0]) 24.00 -0.70 30.80 54.10
Table 2: RL vs Adaptive agent: Average ex-
cess PnL per time-step of RL agent over com-
petitor
Risk Aversion MS target Hedge Cost Inventory PnL Spread PnL Total PnL
0 0.25 -0.73 0.14 81.83 81.24
0.50 -0.00 3.52 -7.92 -4.40
1 0.25 -0.37 0.30 94.16 94.09
0.50 0.74 0.01 4.88 5.64
2 0.25 -0.22 -0.49 93.18 92.47
0.50 2.02 0.54 23.87 26.42
Figure 1: RL Agent vs Competitor: -
distribution. The optimal pricing point ac-
cording to Theorem 1 is 0 against the random
agent and -0.6 against the adaptive agent.
Figure 2: RL vs Adaptive agent: Convergence
during training. Left: adaptive agent - ηms =
0.5, γ = 2. Right: adaptive agent - ηms =
0.5, γ = 0
 = −0.6 against adaptive agent. In the experiment with the adaptive agent, we use the empirical
c.d.f. of b for the adaptive agent after convergence (in blue) and theorem 1 to compute the "optimal
pricing point" for the RL agent i.e.  = −0.6; this coincides with highest RL pricing density (green).
Note, that the "optimal pricing points" are only with respect to spread PnL, whereas the RL agent is
maximizing the Total PnL. However, in practice, the average Total PnL is typically driven by spread
PnL (see tables 1, 2). The results illustrate that the RL agent is able to learn about its competitor’s
pricing strategy from the partial observations of its own pricing and resulting trades.
Price skewing for internalization: The RL agent also learns to skew its pricing for internalization
(see Figure 3). Unlike the adaptive agent that was explicitly designed to skew, the RL agent was
given no prior knowledge or bias to enable skewing. Nevertheless, it learns to skew b lower when
inventory is negative to attract offsetting buys; similarly for positive inventory it skews s lower to
attract sells.
6.2 Price environment
The goal is to study the impact of the mid price drift µ on the inventory held by the RL agent (cf.
section 3.3). If the drift is positive (resp. negative), it is optimal to hold a positive (resp. negative)
inventory as in average on every timestep, the mid-price will go up (resp. down), yielding a positive
inventory PnL. The setup consists of 3 agents: RL, Adaptive and persistent (b = s = 0).
The RL agent is able to learn that pattern well, in particular that i) the inventory held must be an
increasing function of drift and ii) for extremely positive (resp. negative) values of the drift, the
inventory held must be significantly positive (resp. negative).
This is seen on figure 4 showing a zoom of the inventory over 500 rollout timesteps: for µ = 1, at
each new rollout of 200 timesteps, the RL agent starts from 0 inventory and clearly tries to reach as
quickly as possible the highest possible inventory, whereas when µ = −1, the RL agent learned to
hold a negative inventory (average of -16.06). For values of mu closer to 0, the inventory is closer
to 0 as expected, and in average the inventory held for µ = 0.01 (10.82) is higher than in the case
µ = −0.01 (0.97).
Table 3: RL Agent vs Random/Persistent: Mean and standard deviation of s and b for RL agent
Competitor s b
Persistent (-0.5) -0.60 ± 0.16 -0.60 ± 0.16
Persistent (0.0) -0.22 ± 0.15 -0.22 ± 0.13
Random (Unif[−0.5, 0.5]) -0.20 ± 0.15 -0.20 ± 0.15
Random (Unif[−1.0, 1.0]) -0.03 ± 0.14 -0.03 ± 0.22
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Figure 3: RL Agent - Price Skewing. Average b (buy epsilon) and s (sell epsilon) for RL agent at
different levels of inventory. Left: vs persistent ( = 0). Right: vs adaptive (ηms = 0.5, γ = 2).RL
agent skewing: sample simulation against an adaptive agent
Figure 4: RL Agent - inventory for various
mid-price drift values µ, as a function of
time (500 timesteps, i.e. 2.5 rollouts of 200
timesteps)
Figure 5: RL Agent - Distributions of in-
ventory and inventory PnL for different risk
penalties
6.3 Reward function design
The goal is to study the impact of the penalty functions proposed in section 5 on the inventory held
by the RL agent, as well as its inventory PnL. The setup consists of 2 agents: RL and persistent
(b = −0.5, s = 0), and the results are displayed in figure 5.
It is observed that all 3 penalty functions have the desired effect of i) decreasing the inventory and
inventory PnL standard deviation and ii) decreasing the absolute inventory mean value.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
By using a multi-agent simulator to train an RL-based market maker agent with different competitive
scenarios, reward formulations and market price drifts, we have been able to draw key insights into
the behavior of the RL agent. We show that the reinforcement learning agent is able to learn about its
competitor’s pricing policy; it also learns to manage inventory by skewing prices and to maintain a
positive (or negative) inventory depending on whether the market price drift is positive (or negative).
We have also shown that different reward formulations can be used to create a risk averse RL-based
market maker. This allows us to define a spectrum of market makers with different preferences and
simulate more realistic competitive scenarios.
An interesting future direction of research, would be to study the effect of adverse selection and
informed investors on market makers. Our multi-agent framework is particularly suitable for this
because it explicitly models investor agents and allows market makers to counter adverse selection by
tailoring their policies to the agent they are interacting with.
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Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Since the spread PnL is the sum of the sell side and buy side spread PnL, and since we can act
independently on the two sides via b, s, it is maximized when both are maximized. Let us then prove
the theorem for the sell side, the proof for the buy side is identical. Denote 1{·} the indicator function
and vi, i = 1..N the N investor trades (possibly random but independent from s). Then, there are 3
possibilities: either s > comps in which case the RL agent gets 0 trades; s < 
comp
s in which case
the RL agent gets all the trades, and s = comps in which case for each trade, there is a probability p
to get it: we model the latter by Bernoulli(p) random variables yi, i = 1..N , independent from all
other random variables, such that the investor trades in case of s = comps are given by yivi. We get:
SpreadPnL(s) =
(
N∑
i=1
|vi|Sref (vi)(1 + s)
)
1{s<comps }
+
(
N∑
i=1
yi|vi|Sref (vi)(1 + s)
)
1{s=comps }
Taking expectations, using independence between comps , yi, vi, and denoting αN :=∑N
i=1E[|vi|Sref (vi)] we get:
E[SpreadPnL(s)] = (1 + s)αNP [s < comps ]
+(1 + s)αNE[yi]P [s = 
comp
s ]
Since E[yi] = p, P [s < comps ] = 1 − F comps (s), and P [s = comps ] = F comps (s) −
limx→−s F
comp
s (x) (where as usual x→ −s denotes the left limit), we finally get:
∗s = argmaxh() : (1 + )(1− F comps () + pFˆ comps ())
In particular if F comps is continuous, we get Fˆ
comp
s = 0.
In the case Unif[a, b], we have Fˆ comps = 0 and F
comp
s () =
−a
b−a for  ∈ [a, b]. The maximum of the
function h on [−1,∞) is the maximum of that function on [a, b), since for  < a, h() = 1 +  ≤
h(a) = 1 + a and for  ≥ b, h() = 0. Standard calculus shows that the function → (1 + ) b−b−a
has a global maximum located at ∗ = b−12 . Hence, the maximum of h on [a, b) is 
∗ if ∗ ≥ a, and
a otherwise (note that we always have ∗ ≤ b since b ≥ −1).
7.2 Simulation of the exchange reference price
In this section we use the terminology "bid" (resp. "ask") for "buy" (resp. "sell").
The market reference price curve Sref (v) is assumed to be known by all participants and specifies
the cost of trading a size v on the reference exchange (relatively to the mid price), which operates
like a limit order book (cf. figure 6). Such a structure is characterized by 2 lists of 2-tuples (nak, ak),
(nbk, bk), k ≥ 0, where:
• (orders available on the ask side) one can buy at most a size of nak at price level ak, where
(ak) is an increasing sequence and a0 is called the ask price, i.e. the lowest price at which
you can buy (but only at most a size of na0).
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Figure 6: Illustration of a LOB as displayed
in Cont and Mueller (2019)
Figure 7: calibration of Sref
• (orders available on the bid side) one can sell at most a size of nbk at price level bk, where
(bk) is a decreasing sequence and b0 is called the bid price, i.e. the highest price at which
you can sell (but only at most a size of nb0).
For example, if you want to buy a total size of v, the related cost will be given by:
(v −
n∗−1∑
k=0
nak)an∗ +
n∗−1∑
k=0
akn
a
k
n∗ := inf{n : v <
n∑
k=0
nak}
The reference market spread is defined as s0 := a0 − b0 = 2Sref (0), and the reference market mid
price is given by Pt = a0+b02 . In the following we will assume that Sref (v) is the same on the bid
and ask side, so we continue the reasoning with the ask side.
The reference market spread s0 is simulated, at each time step, as a normal random variable of
mean 0.01% and stdev 0.005% (we further enforce s0 to be no less than 0.001% and no more than
0.025%).
We model 10 levels of the bid (resp. ask ) side, given by s02 + n b.p. (1 b.p.=0.01%), n = 0..9. The
volume v(n) available at level n is modeled as:
v(n) = λ︸︷︷︸
scaler
· v(0)︸︷︷︸
best level volume
· shape(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
shape function
shape(0) = 1, v(0) ∼ Gamma Law, E[v(0)] = 1.
The scaler λ is a constant currently calibrated before the experiment such that investor trades process
are able to hit the full range of LOB levels. v(0) and the shape function are random variables
calibrated to LOB data (1 day of stock MSFT). We smooth the raw LOB shape data by fitting a
2nd order polynomial to it, and we sample independently the shape and v(0) at each timestep. This
methodology is illustrated in figure 7, where various sample shapes and generated Sref prices are
presented, together wit a Gamma fit of v(0).
7.3 RL agent reward convergence
7.3.1 Random Agent Competitor
The goal of this section is to show the convergence of the RL reward function in the learning phase
with respect to the number of timesteps, and so for 5 different random number generator seeds. We
display in figures 8 (resp. 9) the reward functions of the RL agent in the learning phase in the case
where it competes against a random agent quoting random prices s, b between -1 and 1 (resp. -0.5
and 0.5). The reward function is shown to converge.
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Figure 8: RL Agent - trained against Random
Agent(-1,1) with 5 different seeds
Figure 9: RL Agent - trained against Random
Agent(-0.5,0.5) with 5 different seeds
Figure 10: RL Agent - trained against Per-
sistent Agent s = b = 0 with 5 different
seeds
Figure 11: RL Agent - trained against Persis-
tent Agent s = b = −0.5 with 5 different
seeds
7.3.2 Persistent Agent Competitor
The goal of this section is to show the convergence of the RL reward function in the learning phase
with respect to the number of timesteps, and so for 5 different random number generator seeds. We
display in figures 10 (resp. 11) the reward functions of the RL agent in the learning phase in the case
where it competes against a persistent agent quoting prices s = b = 0 (resp. s = b = −0.5). The
reward function is shown to converge.
7.4 RL agent hedging
In order to illustrate the ability of the RL agent to outperform its adaptive counterpart in specific
situations, we study the case where hedge cost is zero (i.e. it doesn’t cost anything to hedge inventory),
Sref is high so that one is incentivized to trade with investors, but on the other hand, investors are
toxic in the sense that they have perfect knowledge of the mid price move on future timesteps,
meaning that inventory PnL will always be negative. This setting illustrates the case where e.g. hedge
funds possess complex statistical models that allow them to predict accurately future price moves.
The adaptive agent is set to 50% target market share and risk aversion of 2.
The adaptive agent currently doesn’t keep track of toxicity (i.e. the ability of an investor to predict
mid-price move), so it is expected of the RL agent to exploit that weakness. We display in figure 12
the hedged inventory of both agents as a function of timesteps, as well as the total rewards. It is seen
that the RL agent indeed learns to hedge significantly more than the adaptive agent in this setting, so
that it is able to outperform it.
7.5 Adaptive agent skewing
We illustrate in figures 13, 14 the pricing mechanism of the adaptive agent for risk aversions 0, 2. In
this setting, the adaptive agent has a target market share of 25% and competes against a persistent
agent quoting s = 0, b = −0.5. When the adaptive agent quotes s = b = 0, he would then in
average achieve 25% market share (remember that when 2 agents quote the same price, they have
probability 50% to be selected by the investor). Hence, in the adaptive pricing policy, if there was no
step 2 but only step 1 targeting market share, s = b = 0 would be the optimal level, and this is why
in figures 13, 14, max(b, s) = 0, i.e. at every timestep, the maximum of the blue and green lines
correspond to step 1 of the adaptive pricing policy.
The reason why b − s 6= 0 (i.e. skewing) is because of step 2 which consists of optimizing a
trade-off between spread PnL and aversion to inventory PnL. When risk aversion is zero (figure
12
Figure 12: RL Agent Vs. Adaptive agent - toxic investors - hedged inventory and reward.
Figure 13: Adaptive agent - b, s and Inven-
tory - Risk Aversion=0
Figure 14: Adaptive agent - b, s and Inven-
tory - Risk Aversion=2
13), min(b, s) is -0.6 when min(b, s) = b, and -0.2 when min(b, s) = s: that is, when risk
aversion is zero, the market maker only tries to optimize spread PnL and so it suffices to price just
slightly better than its competitor (which prices at s = 0, b = −0.5). When risk aversion is 2
(figure 14), the market maker is eager to lower its absolute inventory at the expense of its spread PnL,
and that is why in that case, the market maker prices aggressively in order to attract investor flow:
in this case we always have min(b, s) = −0.8 so that the adaptive market maker is guaranteed to
attract a significant amount of investor flow in order to reduce its absolute inventory.
7.6 Adaptive agent hedging policy
Table 6 demonstrates that our adaptive hedging policy outperforms alternative policies - persistent,
random and a similar adaptive policy which ignores internalization (i.e. v = 0). The test was
conducted by evaluating the performance of an agent with an adaptive pricing policy but different
hedging policies, against a persistent agent (b = s = 0, x = 0.2). As expected, ignoring the effect
of internalization leads to over-hedging and poor performance especially when the risk aversion is
high (hedge cost of -43 for γ = 2).
7.7 Adaptive vs Random/Persistent Agents
We validated the effectiveness of the adaptive agent by evaluating it against a random ( b = s ∼
Unif[−1, 1]) and persistent (b = −0.5, s = 0, x = 0.2) agent. In each case, we tested different
adaptive policies, specified by the market share target and risk aversion level for the adaptive agent.
As shown in tables 4 and 5, the adaptive agent is able to outperform its competitors in terms of Total
PnL; in most cases it has an advantage on both spread PnL and hedge cost. However, increasing the
risk aversion decreases the competitiveness of the adaptive agent because it tends to hedge more and
adjust pricing to maximize internalization rather than spread PnL (in Step 2 outlined in 4.1).
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Table 4: Adaptive vs. Persistent Agent: Av-
erage excess PnL per time-step of adaptive
agent over competitor
MS target Risk Aversion Spread PnL Inventory PnL Hedge Cost Total PnL
0.25 0 14.64 0.02 8.67 23.33
1 10.34 -0.06 8.21 18.48
2 0.61 0.03 5.19 5.83
0.50 0 55.7 0.14 2.77 58.61
1 47.75 -0.09 2.58 50.23
2 34.01 -0.15 -2.18 31.68
Table 5: Adaptive vs. Random Agent: Aver-
age excess PnL of per time-step of adaptive
agent over competitor
MS target Risk Aversion Spread PnL Inventory PnL Hedge Cost Total PnL
0.25 0 13.85 -0.03 28.98 42.81
1 -7.3 -0.1 28.32 20.92
2 -21.35 -0.07 25.66 4.24
0.50 0 28.81 0.25 25.38 54.44
1 20.84 0.02 24.88 45.74
2 17.05 -0.03 17.19 34.22
Table 6: Adaptive Hedging Policy vs Alterna-
tives: Average PnL per time-step (multiplied
by 100).
Hedging Policy Spread PnL Inventory Hedge Cost Total PnL
PnL
Random: x ∼ [0, 1] 51.36 0.07 -15.70 35.73
Persistent: x = 0.2 51.43 -0.03 -3.84 47.57
Adaptive: γ = 1 51.39 0.02 -0.22 51.19
Adaptive: γ = 2 51.34 0.10 -1.23 50.21
Adaptive v = 0: γ = 1 51.53 -0.07 -2.30 49.17
Adaptive: v = 0: γ = 2 50.56 -0.01 -43.47 7.08
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